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Early in the procurement planning process, the acquisition team determines the method of 
proposal evaluations that will be used during source selections. The most frequently used 
methods are lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) and tradeoff. LPTA is typically 
used when requirements are well-defined and participants in the evaluation have 
sufficient knowledge to confidently choose a technically acceptable proposal. 
Conversely, tradeoff-based evaluations are employed when the evaluators are not as 
certain about the requirements and utilize non-cost factors to negotiate with offerors. For 
requiring offices, LPTA can be an easier method if the requirements are well-defined and 
commercially available, but they may find performance and deliverables after award to 
be acceptable rather than outstanding. Those using a tradeoff method may find that, by 
clearly defining expectations during negotiations, offerors are better able to deliver on the 
expectations of the acquisition team and the customer. The goal of this project is to 
determine whether or not there is a relationship in U.S. Army contracts between the 
method of procurement (LPTA versus tradeoff source selection methods) and the quality 
of the contract outcomes, to be measured by evaluation of Contract Performance 
Assessment Reports System reports.  
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“Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” —Warren Buffett 
 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) established that members of a federal 
acquisition team are responsible for utilizing “personal initiative and sound business 
judgment in providing the best value product or service to meet the customer’s needs” 
(FAR, 2014, Part 1.102[d]). What constitutes “best value” is also defined by the FAR in 
Part 2 as “the expected outcome of an acquisition that, in the government’s estimation, 
provides the greatest overall benefit in response to the requirement” (FAR, 2014, Part 
2.101). What goes without definition in the FAR is a clear and precise means for 
acquiring best value for the requiring party.  
The current Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition environment is strained 
under the pressure of budget restrictions, limited resources, and increasing bureaucracy. 
The result is an overworked and undersupplied workforce that is still trying to understand 
how to efficiently and effectively garner best value for the government. Policy and 
procedure have dominated the acquisition cycle in efforts to produce contracts that 
deliver acceptable performance with timely procurement administrative lead times 
(PALT); yet, every year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) finds continual 
evidence of underperforming contracts and increasing PALT. In this research we explore 
how best value is theoretically accomplished using contracting, how this impacts the 
current state of the DOD contracting workforce, and how the DOD is measuring the 
outcomes of completed contracts. The purpose of this study is to measure if the use of 
lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) or tradeoff methods impact the quality of 




A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Industry and government have differing views regarding the quality of LPTA in 
evaluation of competitive acquisitions. The government views LPTA as a means of 
utilizing limited resources and spending only the necessary taxpayer dollars. “Contractors 
complain that low-price/technically acceptable source selection results in inferior 
performance or quality because contracts are awarded to the most cut-rate bidders” (Cox, 
2015, para. 5). Industry is showing a general complaint that LPTA results in lower-
quality delivery on contracts, and tradeoff is the better means for government and 
industry to work together.  
B. PURPOSE 
This study aims to define the relationship between the best value continuum 
(LPTA and tradeoff methodologies) and the outcome of competitively awarded contracts. 
By having a better understanding of these methods and the outcomes of the contracts they 
impact, acquisition teams can make more informed decisions regarding which 
methodology to employ for future source selections. The defense budget appears to only 
be shrinking in the foreseeable future; government teams could benefit from verifying if 
LPTA, which is touted as saving the government money in the source selection process, 
actually results in acceptable contract outcomes or if tradeoff gives the government the 
best value. 
This study aims to investigate whether or not the type of methodology for 
obtaining best value procurement has a measurable impact on the documented 
performance or outcome deliverables of that contract. Given the limitations and gradually 
shrinking defense budgets of late, this study’s results could benefit future acquisition 




C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
The objective of this research is to address if the source selection methodology 
(either LPTA or tradeoff) has an effect on the outcome of the contract (quality of 
contractor performance) measured in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting 
System (CPARS). The following research questions are used to guide this endeavor: 
1. Does the utilization of LPTA or tradeoff impact the outcome of 
competitively awarded contracts? 
2. Are acquisition teams making knowledgeable decisions regarding which 
best value methodology is most appropriate for their source selection? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this data gathering was limited to contracts awarded for programs 
under the Army Program Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS) 
that exceeded the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT), currently set at $150,000 (FAR, 
2014, Part 2.101). Contracts must have been competitively awarded, and utilized either 
LPTA or tradeoff methodologies to determine award. The contracts must have been 
closed out as of the beginning of calendar year 2015, so that final CPARS reports could 
be obtained. Contract files must contain pre-award documentation, source selection plans, 
contract award documents, and CPARS reports, at a minimum, to be utilized for this 
study. 
The first effort to gather an appropriate list of contracts for PEO EIS was via a 
query from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), for 
contracts that were awarded via competitive procurement for PEO EIS for $150,000 or 
more, for which entries have been made into CPARS or other post-award performance 
evaluation. From that list, the contracts were found in Electronic Document Access 
(EDA), the online document repository for awarded contracts. Electronic documents were 
acquired from the databases at the participating Army Contracting Command (ACC)-
Rock Island (ACC-RI) office at Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois, and the ACC-New Jersey 
(ACC-NJ) office. The contract files were also requested from the requiring program 
offices for the contracts, to include documents such as the Acquisition Plans/Acquisition 
Strategies, Source Selection Plans, Sections L (instructions, conditions, and notices to 
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offerors or respondents) and M (evaluation factors for award) of the contracts, Pre-and-
Post Negotiation Memorandums, and other pre-award documentation. A memorandum 
from the current Program Executive Office for the Army PEO Enterprise Information 
Systems was provided to participating parties, confirming his approval and the non-
attributional nature of this study. 
E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
The DOD is striving to demonstrate good business judgment and move toward 
smart execution of funds—to hold more power in defense buying. The latest publication 
in the series of Better Buying Power was released on April 9, 2015. Within this release of 
Better Buying Power 3.0 from the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics (USD (AT&L)) Frank Kendall, under the “Incentivize 
Innovation in Industry and Government” (Kendall, 2015c, p. 2) initiative, there is a goal 
to “provide clear ‘best value’ definitions to industry” (Kendall, 2015c, p. 18). This 
guidance is working to reform the DOD to put best value at the forefront of acquisition 
concerns. While results from these reforms will not be seen for years to come, the efforts 
being put forth are indicative of a massive priority shift for DOD procurement. 
Understanding how best value contracting decisions impact the outcomes of the overall 
contract would be beneficial to future acquisition teams seeking efficient means of 
achieving best value. 
The results from the last BBP 2.0 included a best value process manual that is 
scheduled to be added to the official Source Selection Guide, which will hopefully result 
in reduced fear of utilizing tradeoff methods and negotiations for appropriate 
procurements. With clearer indication for the outcomes of a contract, there is a chance for 
be reduced risk of contract waste, fraud and abuse, and bigger potential for achieving best 
value for the government. 
While the goal of this research is to define the relationship between elements of 
the best value continuum and the outcomes of competitively awarded contracts, there are 
limitations to the contract data being considered. This study is only considering Army 
contracts, for the PEO EIS (which is discussed in Chapter III), from select Army 
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contracting commands. This limitation leaves a large amount of data not collected nor 
considered for this study. The specific contract data reviewed is limited to contracts that 
exceed the SAT, were performed between 2001 and 2014 (completely) and also have 
complete and accessible CPARS reports. This limitation leaves contracts with period of 
performance dates prior to 2001, contracts below the SAT or contracts with informal past 
performance information not gathered or analyzed. 
F. SUMMARY 
As Warren Buffett stated in his 2008 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. Annual Report 
and Letter to the Shareholders, “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Best value 
is clearly defined by the FAR, as are the categories on the best value Continuum: LPTA 
and tradeoff. What remains to be measured is whether LPTA or tradeoff will result in 
different levels of value for the government. Buffett continues in his letter by saying, 
“Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it 
is marked down” (Buffett, 2008, p. 5). The same mantra can be applied to government 
acquisition in that acquisition teams must be stewards of the taxpayer dollar and aim to 
receive the best value for the dollar being spent. The aim of this study is to determine if 
one method is better than the other in endeavoring to be conscientious wardens of the 
American dollar. 
This chapter discussed the background information, the problem statement, the 
purpose of this research, the methodology, and the benefits and limitations of this study. 
The next chapter contains the literature review for the basic concepts and issues relevant 
to this project, including source selection methodologies, the modern acquisition 
workforce, how government is working to reform best value contracting, as well as 
criticisms from industry regarding best value contracting. The importance of past 
performance information is discussed, and its impact on source selection evaluation 
boards.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight key information that academia has 
already established to be true or of utmost important to the field of best value contracting. 
It begins with a review of the source selection methodologies utilized in best value 
contracting, LPTA and tradeoff, and the factors that indicate proper utilization of each 
methodology. Additionally, this chapter provides a discussion on the modern acquisition 
workforce and its level of comfort with utilizing best value procurements, and the need 
for acquisition education. This chapter explores the DOD’s efforts to reform best value 
contracting, as well as industry’s criticisms of DOD contract management processes. 
Finally the chapter will conclude with a discussion on the importance of past 
performance information. 
A. SOURCE SELECTION PREPARATION 
The contract management process is composed of six basic phases: procurement 
planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and 
contract closeout. When an acquisition team forms and begins the contract management 
process, the team follows the standard six phases in order, beginning with procurement 
planning. The team will determine what is being procured, the details of the procurement, 
and “which business needs can be best met by procuring products or services outside the 
organization” (Rendon & Garrett, 2005, p. 5). Upon entering the solicitation planning 
phase, the team begins “the process of preparing the documents needed for source 
selection” (p. 5) and starts to make crucial decisions regarding how the evaluation will 
commence during the source selection phase. The team will need to determine not only 
the evaluation factors but also the relative importance of those evaluation factors. The 
team will then determine whether to move forward with the LPTA or tradeoff 
methodologies, depending on a variety of factors pertaining to the acquisition. The source 
selection methodology will be identified in section M of the contract that is released with 
the Request for Proposal (RFP) to industry during the solicitation phase.  
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Section 15 of the FAR, Contracting by Negotiation, discusses source selection 
procedures and how to determine the evaluation factors pertinent to a particular 
acquisition. Specifically, section 15.101 outlines the suitable situations for both the 
tradeoff and LPTA source selection processes. The purpose of section 15.101 is to assist 
agencies in obtaining best value by identifying the varying methods that can be utilized to 
that end. 
This project focuses primarily on the decisions made before and during the source 
selection phase, guided by section 15, and how those decisions impact the contract 
outcomes. Before moving forward into the source selection phase, the acquisition team 
must determine if the acquisition should be evaluated using the LPTA or tradeoff source 
selection methodologies. In order to make that decision, the team must be familiar with 
the methodologies and how to determine if an acquisition is appropriate for either. 
B. THE BEST VALUE CONTINUUM 
Outlined in FAR Part 15.101, “best value” refers to the continuum for proposal 
evaluation on which there are two general types of source selection methods: tradeoff and 
LPTA. To find the appropriate place on this continuum for an acquisition, multiple 
factors and their relative importance must be defined, to include the cost or price, the 
level of requirements definition, the level of risk, and how dominant the roles of non-cost 
factors will be played out in the evaluation. A 2010 GAO report revealed that the DOD 
chose a best value process for approximately “95% of its new, competitively awarded 
contracts on which it had obligated $25M or more in fiscal year 2009” (GAO, 2010, p. 7). 
The remaining 5% were completed using Sealed Bidding, which is a competitive process 
in which award is made to a bidder whose bid conforms to the invitation for bid and is 
most advantageous to the government, considering only price and price-related factors 
included in the solicitation (GAO, 2010, p. 7). Therefore the DOD is extensively utilizing 
best value source selection methodologies found on the best value continuum. 
The best value continuum is a spectrum that is based on the importance of price 
and non-cost factors, relative to price; as the importance of price decreases, the tradeoff 
process is more strongly implemented. LPTA and tradeoff reside at different positions on 
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the continuum, based on the varying importance of non-cost factors. If the sum of non-
cost factors is equal to or more important than price, then tradeoff process is in play, 
while LPTA is utilized when the price is more important than all other non-cost factors 
combined (GAO, 2014b, p. 4).  The best value continuum is defined clearly at FAR 
15.101, 
An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any 
one or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of 
acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may vary. For 
example, in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly definable and the 
risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may 
play a dominant role in source selection. The less definitive the 
requirement, the more development work required, or the greater the 
performance risk, the more technical or past performance considerations 
may play a dominant role in source selection. (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101) 
The Best Value Continuum, seen in Figure 1, is a spectrum with points located 
based on the importance of price and non-cost factors: 
 
Figure 1.  Source Selection Processes on the Best Value Continuum (from 
GAO, 2014b) 
According to the design of the best value continuum, as the importance of price 
decreases the non-cost factors becoming increasingly more important, thereby indicating 
the appropriate environment for a tradeoff procurement. However, as the procurement’s 
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importance of cost grows and outweighs the importance of non-cost factors, LPTA 
becomes the more appropriate choice for the procurement. 
1. Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 
LPTA is a best value source selection method utilized when “the best value is 
expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the lowest 
evaluated price” (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101-2). Requirements are typically well defined, 
the technical requirements are clear and there is no need for tradeoffs. 
Fewer resources (time, money, and people) are necessary to perform a LPTA 
evaluation. Relatively inexperienced acquisition personnel can perform the evaluation. 
Under a LPTA requirement, contractual expectations and technical requirements are not 
easy to misunderstand, and therefore it is easy to determine if a proposal is technically 
acceptable. “LPTA should be used in situations where DOD would not realize any value 
from a proposal exceeding its minimum technical or performance requirements and that 
another process should be used when standards or performance and quality are 
subjective” (GAO, 2014b, p. 6). LPTA is frequently used for purchase of commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) products and services. If there is no additional benefit from paying 
more, then the lowest price technically acceptable method is best.  
2. Tradeoff 
Tradeoff is a best value source selection evaluation method utilized when “it may 
be in the best interest of the Government to consider award to other than the lowest 
priced offeror or other than the highest technically rated offeror” (FAR, 2014, Part 
15.101-1). Requirements are typically not as well defined, the work is experimental or the 
government is looking for the contractor to be innovative in its solutions. The solicitation 
for a tradeoff acquisition “shall state whether all evaluation factors other than cost or 
price, when combined, are significantly more important than, approximately equal to, or 
significantly less important than cost or price” (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101-1[b], [2]). 
Non-cost factors are evaluation factors that are not related in any direct way to the 
cost of a contract. Examples include past performance, evaluation of the technical 
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capability, small business participation, and delivery schedule. Non-cost factors open the 
door for discussions between the government and the offerors, especially in negotiations, 
making for better understanding between all parties of the requirements, the level of 
expectations, incentives, and other pertinent elements of a successful business 
relationship. According to GAO Report 11-8, the most utilized evaluation factors under 
tradeoff were found to be Past Performance, Technical Evaluation, Timing of Delivery 
(where delivery of a final product or service was crucial to the contract’s success), 
Reliability of performance in hazard zones, and Innovation. Non-cost factors used most 
often were Past Performance and Technical Capability (GAO, 2010, p. 13). 
Under tradeoff, there is need for better communication between government and 
contractor regarding requirements. Better discussion surrounding clarity of requirements 
and chances for incentivizing for quality contract performance and outcomes are key to a 
successful tradeoff. Tradeoff can be particularly rewarding for requirements that are not 
as clear, the work is relatively new, or the government is looking for innovative 
approaches from industry. Kendall identifies in Better Buying Power 3.0 that “whenever 
the Warfighter is willing to pay more for above threshold requirements or performance 
standards and may benefit from an innovative and technologically superior solution to 
meet their mission needs, a tradeoff source selection process between cost or price and 
non-cost factors is optimal” (Kendall, 2015c, p. 2). The situations that afford the greatest 
chance for a successful tradeoff are clear, but too often overlooked in the rush to make 
award or the ever-increasing pressure of budgetary constraints. Tradeoff source selection 
requires more time, money and people than a LPTA source selection. The tradeoff 
methodology can be a wonderful means of achieving innovative solutions that lead to 
technological advances for the DOD, if the acquisition teams are dedicated to the chance 
of achieving a quality tradeoff discussion. In order to achieve the desired results from 
discussions regarding non-cost factors, the acquisition team must understand how to 
properly utilize non-cost factors in the hopes of obtaining best value for the government. 
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-COST FACTORS AND PROPER 
UTILIZATION 
The easier way to determine savings and a “better deal” is when the price can be 
compared between two like items. When dealing with non-cost factors, that simplicity is 
lost and the acquisition team must determine the importance of factors that do not have 
an objective dollar value, and furthermore, determine the weight of those non-cost factors 
in relation to the dollar value. Thoroughly identifying the importance of those factors, as 
well as understanding the reliability of that data, can pay off handsomely throughout the 
evaluation process. 
Evaluation of service contracts requires a different level of quality review—unlike 
a product contract that delivers an end item of supply, service contracts require constant 
surveillance and monitoring in order to keep minor problems from escalating beyond 
control and ultimately resulting in loss of quality. Past performance is one of the most 
utilized non-cost factors for evaluation, which can call into question the reliability of that 
past performance information. The GAO reported in the 09-374 report that past 
performance information was reluctantly relied upon by officials “due, in part, to their 
skepticism about the reliability of the information and difficulty assessing relevance to 
specific acquisitions” (GAO, 2009, p. 2). If government was not properly and 
consistently reporting on the performance of the contractors, then how could future 
source selection boards benefit from the knowledge gleaned from that performance? Only 
by standardizing and regulating how contractor past performance is reported can that data 
be relied upon to provide value during a source selection. 
Converting non-cost factors to a dollar value is a concept discussed by Kendall, as 
we will explore later in this paper. By monetizing performance metrics, there is increased 
customer involvement in understanding requirement pricing, thereby giving the customer 
an insight into how the evaluators will make their decision. By knowing how much the 
customer is willing to pay, based on the value of the increased performance, a stronger 
justification can be made for the decisions based on non-cost factors, to potentially 
reduce the chance for successful protests. Further, as industry is better aware of how 
decisions are made regarding non-cost factors and what is most important to the 
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government, the quality of proposals could increase as well as reduced costs for the 
contractor as time is better spent on proposal development. 
Risk is a non-cost factor that may not be typically seriously considered for 
contracts not in a contingency-type environment. When there is concern that a contractor 
will need to perform on time and in a dangerous area, risk is on the forefront of 
everyone’s mind. Further from the front burner is the concept of cost risk, which is 
“meant to be a measure of the degree of difference between an offeror’s proposed cost 
and the government’s developed, most probable cost” (Graham, 2007, p. 32). As 
proposals are received and the gap between the government’s expectations and the 
contractor’s proposal are measured, cost risk can be identified and considered as a non-
cost factor during discussions. The unreliability of a government estimate, however, 
increases the risk that the contract will not be fairly priced in accordance with the 
contract requirements. As non-cost factors are understood and utilized effectively, 
tradeoff is a less terrifying process than its reputation touts.  
As the importance of non-cost factors increases and becomes of equal to or more 
important than the cost factor, the source selection process to obtain best value for the 
government becomes a tradeoff process. In order to understand the importance of non-
cost factors, the acquisition team must understand the degree to which requirements are 
defined, the limitations of budget, the degree to which the government is willing to flex 
on each factor—multiple important issues need to be discussed by the acquisition team, 
including expectations for contractor proposals. The Better Buying Power (BBP) 
initiative was initially released by the USD, Dr. Ashton Carter, in 2010 (at that time, the 
USD (AT&L)). BBP identifies seven major areas that USD (AT&L) is pursuing to 
“enhance and incentivize efficiency” (Carter, 2010, p. 3), thereby inviting industry to 
work together with government in the tradeoff process. Government should be making 
strides towards better understanding where to accommodate “paying more (up to some 
amount) than the minimum price bid in return for a product that provides more than the 
minimum needed performance” (GAO, 2014b, p. 6). Acquisition teams may or may not 
be dedicating ample time to discussing the importance of the factors being evaluated in 
making the source selection decision, or are not thoroughly analyzing the customer’s 
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needs over the wants. If innovation is needed, for example, then price may not the most 
important factor. These discussions and concerns are difficult to see to fruition when the 
issue of funding is looming overhead. 
Policymakers often insist that the best way to define “best value” is in monetary 
terms. The customer and the acquisition team need to firmly measure the extent to which 
more money earns more performance, and the limit to where dollars provide a return on 
investment. While the requiring party is the one benefitting from the final contract 
performance, the source selection authority is the party making the decision to award to 
the offeror, and has to justify that decision. Kendall discussed in a recent Defense AT&L 
Magazine article, “Getting ‘Best Value’ for the Warfighter and the Taxpayer,” the protest 
fear that overcomes acquisition teams, and the resulting reliance on choosing the low-cost 
offer purely because it is easy to defend: “The likely bias for an acquisition official 
making the source selection is to take the lowest-price offer; it’s much easier to defend 
than the subjective judgment that the higher-cost offeror was worth the difference in 
price” (Kendall, 2015b, p. 2). There are benefits to monetizing performance metrics, 
including increased customer involvement in understanding requirement pricing (“it 
forces our customers—the operators who set requirements—to consider how much they 
are willing to pay for higher performance” [p. 2]) and inviting industry to be intimately 
aware of the importance of clear pricing: 
We want industry to be in a position to make informed judgments about 
what level of performance to offer. The easiest way to accomplish this is 
to tell industry exactly, in dollars and cents, what higher levels of 
performance are worth to us....Value or worth to the buyer has nothing to 
do with cost; it is only about what we would be willing to pay for 
something. (Kendall, 2015b, pp. 2–3) 
Beyond the open communication benefit with the customer and with industry, 
there is benefit in reduced protests, since factors previously non-monetized no longer 
invite criticism on basis of subjectivity. “Avoiding successful protests is about setting 
down the rules for source selection, following them religiously, documenting the 
decisions we make so we can explain them if challenged, and maintaining the process 
integrity” (Kendall, 2015b, p. 2). The training for source selection teams prior to 
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performing evaluations only revolves around the ethical issues of fairness. The pressure 
to maintain strict ethical conduct and avoid potential for protest may inadvertently lead 
acquisition teams to take an “easier” path and therefore only utilize the LPTA method, 
even if the requirements are not appropriate for that method or the potential for garnering 
better value lie in utilizing the tradeoff method. 
The differences in using LPTA or tradeoff again lie in the solidity of the 
requirements and the degree of flexibility between those requirements and price. 
“Sometimes LPTA makes sense but it doesn’t make sense if we are willing, as we usually 
are, to pay a little more for a much better product” (Kendall, 2015b, p. 3). If all parties 
understand what the government is looking to buy, and the elements on which they are 
willing to be flexible and pay more, there is greater likelihood that the finalized contract 
will be most appropriate and be of best value to the government even if the price is 
slightly higher. Understanding the factors involved and whether there is a necessity for 
tradeoff is most important, as “LPTA is appropriate when we have well-defined standards 
of performance and we do not place any value on, and are therefore unwilling to pay for, 
higher performance” (p. 3). If there is potential for significant performance benefit by 
paying just a little more, most acquisition professionals with good business judgment 
would agree that the taxpayer and customer are amenable to that tradeoff.  
The DOD is clearly making significant efforts to improve upon best value 
contracting. Even with these increased efforts to properly remind the acquisition 
community of the proper utilization of both best value methods, however, use of LPTA is 
on the rise as of recent. 
D. INCREASING USE OF LPTA 
Year after year, the DOD is stricken with mandates to reduce costs and reduce 
funding for programs, which leave those programs to make do with less funding for a 
mission that is equal to or greater than the year before. The changing technological 
landscape and changing missions needs leave acquisition professionals with few options 
but to further employ use of LPTA. “DOD officials acknowledged several challenges in 
using the best value tradeoff process such as the difficulties in developing meaningful 
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evaluation factors, the additional time investment needed to conduct best value 
procurements, and the business judgment required of acquisition staff when compared to 
other acquisition approaches” (GAO, 2010, p. 21). There is therefore a belief amongst 
DOD officials that LPTA acquisitions require fewer resources to implement, while 
tradeoff typically requires more time to evaluate factors, weigh significance of non-cost 
factors, and engage in meaningful negotiations—time and resources which the 
government cannot afford for multiple simultaneous procurements. 
LPTA has been gradually increasing, used at nearly the same rate as tradeoff, 
suggesting that the simplified method is becoming more accessible for teams that are 
seeking efficient evaluations to reach award to vendors faster with fewer complex 
elements. “In making tradeoff decisions, GAO found that DOD selected a lower priced 
proposal nearly as often as it selected a higher technically rated, but more costly 
proposal” (GAO, 2010, p. 2). Kendall defines in his recent memorandum, Appropriate 
Use of Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable Source Selection Process and Associated 
Contract Type, that LPTA is “the most appropriate source selection process to apply only 
when there are well-defined requirements, the risk of unsuccessful contract performance 
is minimal, price is a significant factor in the source selection, and there is neither value, 
need, nor willingness to pay for higher performance” (Kendall, 2015a, p. 1). Complex, 
poorly-defined requirements where the DOD is seeking innovative solutions therefore 
does not meet the requirements for use of LPTA. With increasing pressure to award 
contracts quickly and efficiently, however, LPTA would understandably be utilized more 
frequently than a time-consuming negotiation method, and can be tempting to use always, 
even if the procurement is not appropriate for that source selection method.  
The capability and competence of the modern acquisition workforce is essential to 
developing successful contracts. The acquisition team, comprising contracting and non-
contracting personnel, is charged with selecting the most appropriate source selection 
methodology in order to gain best value for the government. With this known 
responsibility, how certain can we be that any given acquisition team is capable of 
selecting the most appropriate methodology? 
 17 
E. CURRENT ACQUISITION PERSONNEL: EXPERIENCE, 
KNOWLEDGE, AND COMFORT WITH BEST VALUE 
PROCUREMENTS 
The DOD in 2011 “was put on the verge of a retirement-driven talent drain in this 
workforce after 11 consecutive years of downsizing” (GAO, 2012, p. 2). Following the 
massive reduction of the workforce and its assets, the U.S. found itself engaging in 
multiple wars worldwide and a technological boom that required excessive growth and 
purchasing in order to remain a leader in worldwide defense.  
An underlying issue of the acquisition workforce is the lack of confidence in 
executing complex contracting actions. The DOD reacted to the downsizing of personnel 
in the 1990s by increasing its acquisition workforce positions from 133,102 in fiscal year 
(FY)09 to 151,355 in FY13, just in the contracting career field (GAO, 2014b, p.17). This 
massive hiring of new contracting personnel could pay dividends in the future, but the 
current landscape shows a general discomfort with executing complex contracting 
actions, as there has not been enough time (nor resources available) to get these 
unseasoned contracting personnel up to speed.  
LPTA is typically a more comfortable process, since it takes less intimate 
knowledge of a product or service requirement and rather relies more heavily on the cost 
evaluation. A general discomfort with intimate knowledge of a requirement, in addition 
to limited time and resources to work on a single procurement when hundreds of other 
actions are standing by, leads acquisition teams to utilize LPTA over tradeoff. 
Diversity is not the issue in the workforce, but rather a wide gap in the levels of 
experience in each group; while a majority of the workforce is currently near or eligible 
for retirement, the remaining personnel do not have the on-the-job experience necessary 
to facilitate complex procurements confidently, which has resulted in an increase of 
LPTA procurements for their simplicity as well as a number of best value procurements 
being overall incorrectly utilized. 
According to GAO report 14-584, “Several contracting and program officials said 
that their commands gave more attention to whether LPTA is an alternative option in 
light of declining budgets and efficiency initiatives” (GAO, 2014b, p. 1). GAO found that 
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for contracts valuing $25M or more there is an increased use of LPTA between 2009 and 
2013 (increase by 10%) and a decrease in use of tradeoff (decrease by 11%) (p. 9). 
Several agencies, including the Army, Navy and Air Force (p. 13) cite the Better Buying 
Power initiative in the use of LPTA as fewer personnel resources are required for a LPTA 
evaluation than a tradeoff, and even less-experienced acquisition personnel can perform a 
LPTA evaluation—a solid example of “doing more without more” (p. 5). DOD officials 
believe that LPTA requires less manpower to review complex non-cost evaluation 
factors, less time to review proposals, less time to make award. In an environment where 
there is less of everything—time, money and manpower—and an increasingly larger 
mission with needs to be met, the DOD has invested less in training its workforce to 
handle challenging acquisitions and rather to employ LPTA whenever possible. “DOD 
predominantly used best value processes in FY13, but increased its use of LPTA for 
higher dollar contracts since FY09” (GAO, 2014b, p. 9) for obligations of $25M or more, 
indicating that even though best value is still the main goal, acquisition personnel are 
more often choosing the road more easily traveled. Even though the DOD budget is being 
reduced year after year, the mission remains the same; therefore, to do “more without 
more” there is a greater need for intelligent business decisions and strong negotiating 
skills to get bigger returns on the American taxpayer dollar. 
Quality of education of the acquisition workforce has taken a back seat, given the 
rush to get contracts awarded combined with the influx of new, unseasoned acquisition 
personnel. The range of educational courses offered by the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) for source selection are mandatory for contracting personnel, but offer 
only what the classroom can—theoretical application. According to officials from the 
Assistance Secretary for the Army for Acquisition, Logistics & Technology (ASA 
(ALT)), “on-the-job training provides important exposure for less experienced acquisition 
staff to the source selection decision making processes” (GAO, 2014b, p. 21). So while 
contracting personnel may show they are qualified on paper, defense officials still attest 
that the best training is on-the-job training, for which the seasoned contracting personnel 
have little time in which to engage. More value needs to be placed on the importance of 
diverse education if the goal of best value is to be achieved. 
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F. NECESSITY FOR ACQUISITION EDUCATION 
The tradeoff process is not necessarily flawed, but most would agree that the 
education of those using the process is lacking, therefore resulting in inappropriate 
practice of the process. GAO reported in the 11-8 Report, Enhanced Training Could 
Strengthen DODs Best Value Tradeoff Decisions,  
DOD officials also noted that the complexity of the tradeoff process 
increases the risk of bid protests…for example, GAO found that 15 of the 
88 contracts awarded using a best value tradeoff process reviewed were 
protested to GAO, resulting in 4 cases in which DOD determined that it 
failed to adhere to the solicitations’ requirements. (GAO, 2010, p. 1) 
Protests are undesirable for acquisition personnel as contracts (and thus the entire 
project) cannot move forward and focus must be shifted to defending source selection 
decisions. The acquisition teams attempting to utilize best value are either 
misunderstanding the stipulations necessary to utilize best value, or are finding late in the 
acquisition that their evaluation methodology was chosen incorrectly. Lack of forward 
planning and careful prioritization of requirements can lead to the need to change section 
M after offers have been received, which can lead to protest. 
The need for education amongst the acquisition workforce is apparent, but the 
method of delivering that education is debatable. Some consider on-the-job training to be 
one of the most essential means of gathering sound source selection decision-making 
skills, but that process takes years and the valuable time of seasoned professionals. The 
most frequently employed option for defense acquisition education is from DAU. There 
are five core DAU courses regarding source selection evaluations:  
• CLC 007—Contract Source Selection 
• CON 121—Contract Planning 
• CON 200—Business Decisions for Contracting 
• CON 280—Source Selection and Administration of Service Contracts 
• CON 334—Advanced Contingency Contracting Officer’s Course 
(GAO, 2014b, p. 19–20) 
It should be noted that while these courses are required for contracting personnel, 
the acquisition team is not comprised entirely of contracting personnel. Other acquisition 
personnel, such as program managers, technical managers, financial managers, are not 
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necessarily required to take these courses. What training is provided to other functional 
areas of the acquisition workforce working on source selection boards and making high-
level contracting decisions? The potential lack of training for non-contracting personnel 
could be cause for concern. 
Each course contains curriculum that specifically benefits a source selection team. 
These courses provide quality information from seasoned acquisition professionals and 
build a foundation for acquisition knowledge. While DAU training is essential to build a 
baseline for acquisition education, on-the-job training supplements and fills in gaps with 
real-world experience. The increased workload of acquisition professionals and 
bureaucracy of requirements for the acquisition process leads to an overworked, 
undereducated staff that must make award with limited resources. In essence, the problem 
is not the quality of the education, but rather the limited time allotted for acquisition 
professionals to break away from their jobs for in-residence course time. Just as rare is 
the time for seasoned professionals to impart knowledge on the newer workforce. 
Beyond the established need for education, the challenging environment in which 
defense acquisition professionals must operate adds immeasurable stress to the 
procurement process. Best value proves to be helpful in unstable environments, such as 
war zones where past performance and technical capability are factors of greater 
importance, and for construction projects where safety and schedule requirements are 
paramount. LPTA, however, is being used more frequently for purchase of standard 
commercial products, and are proven to require fewer resources to meet award timelines. 
To mandate that one method must be used over another invites a myriad of examples that 
prove the opposite. Defense professionals must become seasoned in the rules of 
acquisition in order to navigate in challenging environments. The tradeoff process has 
been determined to be “far more time-consuming than other approaches,” 
“administratively burdensome,” and due to the extensive time of the acquisition process, 
it is “challenging to keep the same acquisition team together for an entire procurement” 
(GAO, 2010, p. 18). Contracting Officers are also nervous about the increased risk of a 
bid protest due to the complexity of the tradeoff process, which creates an environment of 
caution and wariness for trying new contracting approaches. 
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There is a thirst for standardization in the tradeoff process, and further, a desire 
for knowledgeable personnel who can provide sound business judgment. Acquisition 
professionals find that “developing non-cost factors that meaningfully discriminate 
between offers is a challenging part of the tradeoff process” (GAO, 2010, p. 17). 
Therefore, just getting the evaluation factors defined is strenuous for an inexperienced 
workforce. Furthermore, “the absence of meaningful non-cost discriminators can result in 
offerors receiving equal scores on the factors that were identified as being significantly 
more important than price” (p. 17). So if the tradeoff process was selected because the 
non-cost factors were deemed more important than price, but then those non-cost factors 
were not meaningful, then the resulting acquisition method is not only inappropriate for 
LPTA but also poorly designed for a an appropriate tradeoff. If the acquisition team was 
entering an acquisition well-equipped with knowledge of the requirement, sound business 
judgment, and a wealth of experience and confidence in performing a source selection, 
there is greater chance for a successful contract and beneficial outcomes.  
In order to give a contract the chance to be successful, the acquisition team must 
be prepared and confident in their knowledge of contracting. For an organization to foster 
an appreciation for education and expertise in best value contracting, there must be an 
environmental shift to put best value contracting on the forefront of policymaking 
decisions and DOD priorities. The DOD is making efforts to provide guidance to best 
utilization of best value contracting methods, but the impact of these measures will take 
time to evaluate. 
G. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO REFORM BEST VALUE 
In April 2015, the third installment of the Better Buying Power series was 
released. Within the release of version 3.0, under the “Incentivize Innovation in Industry 
and Government” initiative (Kendall, 2015c, p. 2), there is a goal to “provide clear and 
objective ‘best value’ definitions to industry” (p. 18). This general guidance states: 
This BBP 3.0 initiative builds on the work started in BBP 2.0 to provide 
industry with information on the value, in monetary terms, of higher levels 
of performance than minimally acceptable or threshold levels. Without 
this information, the default position will be to bid to the lowest 
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acceptable level of performance. With this information, industry will 
know what the competitive effect of offering higher performance will be 
and can bid accordingly. (Kendall, 2015c, p. 18) 
Government is clearly working towards revitalizing the implementation of quality 
best value practices, although industry may not be aware of these strides until evidence of 
improvement is visible from active acquisition teams. Kendall followed up with a memo 
in May 2015 titled the Appropriate Use of LPTA Source Selection Process and 
Associated Contract Type, which not only anticipates a shift from use of Firm Fixed Price 
or Time & Materials to a Cost Plus Fixed Fee Level of Effort contract type, but more 
importantly emphasizes that the DOD is not utilizing LPTA in its “limited place in the 
source selection ‘best value’ continuum” (Kendall, 2015a, p. 1). Kendall identifies how 
DOD has been inappropriately utilizing LPTA for acquisitions too complex or with less-
defined requirements that would benefit from an innovative contactor solution, and as a 
result “can miss an opportunity to secure an innovative, cost-effective solution to meet 
Warfighter needs to help maintain our technological advantage” (p. 1–2). Industry has 
responded already to this memorandum with favor, as LPTA has historically denied 
industry the chance to propose an inventive solution for somewhat murkier requirements. 
Bob Lohfeld responded to this memorandum in an April 2015 Washington Technology 
article stating that for technical service and solution procurements, “increased 
performance generally provides additional value to the government, and the government 
should strive to achieve an innovative, cost-effective solution to meet mission needs and 
maintain our technology advantage” (Lohfeld, 2015, para. 5). DOD and industry 
therefore agree that unless acquisition teams strive harder to properly utilize LPTA where 
appropriate and tradeoff where innovation is key, the U.S. will gradually lose the 
technological edge in worldwide defense. If DOD seeks to gain the best value for the 
Soldier where it counts, proper requirements development and best value method 
employment are critical steps in achieving that chance for technological superiority. 
Surmounting the hurdles that divide government and industry is a challenge that 
can be approached by identifying industry’s perceptions and criticisms of the government 
procurement process. While the DOD is making strides to reform the best value 
contracting methodology, there are skeptical audiences that would suggest other ways to 
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reform parts of the process. The next section will discuss a sample of industry criticisms 
of government procurement and solicitation planning, and the source selection evaluation 
phase.  
H. INDUSTRY CRITICISMS OF SOURCE SELECTION PRACTICES 
Industry and government often have conflicting priorities that overtake the 
discussions and goals of the mission. While government is responsible for being good 
stewards of the taxpayer dollars and the best interests of the public, industry is 
responsible for the concerns of their stakeholders, which often includes profit. 
Conflicting priorities often result in burden on the contracting process, but can also reveal 
inherent issues with the system that, if addressed, can facilitate the contracting process 
into obtaining best value and benefit for industry and government alike. 
1. Procurement Planning Phase 
The two sides of the fence on which industry and government reside are filled 
with differing priorities that result in hearty proposal evaluations when both are willing to 
discuss. Cox in his article “Finding a Bargain for Government Buyers Shouldn’t Be a 
Crime” from Government Executive magazine argues this point citing that while industry 
complains that use of LPTA takes a bite out of costs (in terms of proposal development 
and aiming to underbid to stay competitive)—when in reality it mostly just takes a bite 
out of industry profits—that “bite” is nothing compared to the overall budget cuts 
happening in DOD (Cox, 2015). While in a generous world the government would work 
harder to reward the contractor with higher profits, or industry would relinquish profits in 
the name of the taxpayer dollar, the reality is that neither party is willing to financially 
give away the farm, resulting in a contentious debate over costs. Contracting Officers 
work hard to establish fair and reasonable pricing from offerors to ensure that all parties 
are experiencing a fair business relationship, but the perception amongst industry remains 
skeptical of the government’s practices. 
Cox goes on to make the classic argument that if industry and government worked 
together to develop accurately written requirements documents, then industry could 
propose accordingly and the government would get what it asks for (Cox, 2015). 
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However, when requirements are poorly defined and LPTA is utilized, the resulting 
proposals do not necessarily hit the “technically acceptable” mark for what the 
government desires. As a result, either protests ensue or the government moves forward 
and receives inadequate performance with no room to recoup expenses. 
Another widely accepted opinion Cox demonstrates is that industry insists that 
tradeoff is more beneficial to the government, but that insistence is really a performance 
in which industry tells the government what to buy (Cox, 2015). Using this reasoning, the 
government is not incentivized to correct poorly defined requirements, and instead uses 
industry to develop the requirements and deliver the requirements—at a premium. While 
all can agree that there must be a meeting of the minds in order for both sides of the fence 
to speak the same language and reach consensus on contract performance requirements, 
the contentious nature of the cost-saving priorities on both sides is a challenging obstacle 
to overcome. 
In a 2014 National Defense Magazine article, Stew Magnuson refers to a 
conference where the president of a satellite company stated that government “is 
exchanging new applications and value added services for lower prices” (Magnuson, 
2014, para. 3). The president goes on to say that “you may have written the best proposal 
of your life…but it will never be read by the government because of that LPTA 
requirements…it is a shame because there is no room for innovation when you do that” 
(Magnuson, 2014, para. 6). Magnuson quotes in his article a president of a satellite 
communications company as saying “the lowest bid gets its proposal evaluated to see if it 
meets the technical requirements…if it does, none of the others are considered or even 
read” (Magnuson, 2014, para. 6). Any knowledgeable contracting officer would refute 
that accusation and insist that all proposals are reviewed; but this does not reduce that 
stigma among industry if time after time the lowest bidder is found to be the winner. This 
increased tension between government and industry, as well as an increasing fear of 
protest amongst acquisition professionals, is contributing to higher walls being 
constructed between the two entities. An early mitigation for this tension is to invite 
industry to discussion regarding the requirements development to get them involved 
earlier in requirements discussions. 
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There is a very clear need for stronger industry involvement in requirements 
development and market research. This is a beneficial step not in the sense that industry 
is writing the requirements on which they would bid, but government would get a better 
idea for what is most important in their acquisition if they discuss the requirement openly 
with industry prior to release of the final RFP. The acquisition team should be performing 
thorough market research to have insight regarding the capabilities of industry and 
concentration of certain skills and practices, before determining if there is even room for 
innovation in an acquisition.  If requirements are well-developed and cost estimates are 
firm and display all aspects of potential costs, then reviewing and evaluating proposals 
should be relatively simple, as all data involved is reliable. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when government was in the throes of reducing 
costs and downsizing bureaucracy and personnel, best value may not have been 
implemented properly by source selection teams, thereby resulting in a negative view of 
tradeoff practices in industry. In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Legislation and 
National Security of the Committee on Government Operations in May 1993, Stephanie 
Biddle, President of the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), 
stated in response to the recently approved Federal Acquisition Improvement Act of 
1993: 
Industry’s greatest concern with best value is not that we don’t think the 
government ought to get it; we think that the problem is the very loose 
evaluation criteria that characterize these acquisitions and that may, in 
fact, produce an award that is not based on any meaningful competition. 
The evaluation criteria in best value procurements usually do not tell 
vendors critical information regarding the relative importance that the 
agency places on price and technical factors. A typical best value 
procurement solicitation may say little more than technical considerations 
are more important than cost. But the agency does not give any indication 
regarding the extent to which technical considerations will outweigh price. 
Put into terms that you and I can understand, it is like saying, “I don’t 
know if I want to buy a Cadillac that is comfortable or I want to buy a 
little less expensive car that gets good gas mileage.” You have to have 
some idea what you want to buy before you spend hundreds of millions of 
dollars. (Biddle, 1993, p. 121) 
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This scathing review of government performance provides a concise snapshot of 
how industry viewed government’s grasp on requirements development and its shoddy 
application towards tradeoff. Biddle is emphasizing with the Cadillac example that even 
if the Cadillac’s requirements are well-defined, if there are no properly described 
evaluation factors from which industry can understand where government’s priorities lie, 
then only half of the necessary information is present. As with Cox’s previously reviewed 
accusation that government relies too heavily on industry’s ability to write requirements, 
Biddle confirms that even if the requirements are well written for that Cadillac, the 
evaluation factors must coincide with the government’s priorities for those requirements 
to come to fruition with a capable Contractor. Given the strides that DAU courses, 
defined policies and better understanding of how to develop and implement evaluation 
factors for source selections (due to the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1993) have 
made, this rift has been addressed if not somewhat closed. While industry and 
government may still disagree on the requirements themselves, there are paths forward to 
opening communication between both parties via properly prioritized evaluation factors. 
2. Solicitation Preparation Phase 
Lohfeld argues in his 2012 Washington Technology article “Will low-price 
contracting make us all losers?” that LPTA is not being used effectively, therefore LPTA 
is not an effective evaluation method (Lohfeld, 2012). Given the recent increased use of 
LPTA, government needs to be making strides in using LPTA effectively. The 
government’s take on requirements needs to shift from telling industry how they are to 
perform without considering their input, and move to engaging industry in requirements 
development early in the process (Lohfeld, 2012). When both parties understand the end 
goal, and work together to write requirements that speak to that level of effort, the RFPs 
could more accurately depict what the government is seeking to acquire. By engaging in 
discussions early, government is less likely to misstep and inadvertently write 
requirements too vague for which too many vendors are deemed technically acceptable. 
Scott Calisti suggests in his DAU AT&L magazine article, “Lowest Price 
Technically Acceptable: Why All the Debate?” that industry continues to be 
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unwelcoming of LPTA as a means of evaluation, insisting that while cost is being driven 
down, so, too, is quality, stating that “LPTA drives us to only a ‘low cost, low quality’ 
solutions” (Calisti, 2015, p. 17). Industry insists LPTA “stifles innovation and squeezes 
corporate margins due to downward pressure on price” (p. 17), which ultimately “causes 
performance innovators to depart the market and reduce the quality of goods and services 
provided” (p. 17). While these observations are limited in scope, there is a compelling 
argument for the detractions of LPTA. These negative misnomers are rooted in the 
misuse of LPTA by the government. LPTA is not being used appropriately, and is driven 
so by the regulations, policy, guidance, and training that have misled acquisition 
professionals. Again, if the requirements are well-defined and the risk of unsuccessful 
contract performance is minimal, and price has been determined to be the only deciding 
factor for best value, then LPTA is the optimal choice for evaluation. The five DAU 
courses that assist in training contracting professionals in source selection skills and other 
agency mediums for training adhere to the appropriate use of LPTA, but the skills are 
either not being translated appropriately into use or are being misunderstood. 
Calisti continues, “Industry contends that quality solutions and LPTA are 
mutually exclusive and we cannot buy quality goods and services” (Calisti, 2015, p. 20). 
If the government has determined their requirements and are certain where the dollar is 
limited on providing further returns, then industry is forced to offer higher performance 
for reduced cost to remain competitive, which cuts into profits and is undesirable for 
industry. As long as government is adhering to standards of best value, and not simply 
employing LPTA because resources for a proper tradeoff evaluation are limited or 
pressure to make a timely award are overwhelming, then industry’s profit margins are not 
of their concern. 
3. Source Selection Evaluation Phase 
According to Robert Graham, in his 2007 article in Contract Management entitled 
“Improving Source Selections,” the “conspiracy of hope” occurs when “industry 
encouraged to be overly optimistic in their offers and government imposes little or no 
financial risk to those who submit such offers” (Graham, 2007, p. 28). The conspiracy is 
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that they can underbid early, and upon contract award begin to ramp up the costs via 
modifications and change proposals previously left undiscussed or not considered in the 
Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE). Graham refers to the IGCE as the Most 
Probable Cost (MPC), as it goes beyond the traditional IGCE to capture all possible costs, 
not just the minimum standard or average costs the government desires to spend. Using 
the MPC indicates that the government has thoroughly considered the probabilities of 
costs based on well-developed requirements (p. 32). 
The importance of cost risk is important to note as a separate factor that can 
enhance proposal risk evaluation. Graham recommends determining a high-confidence 
cost estimate earlier in the source selection (as in, going beyond the IGCE) and elevating 
the cost risk evaluation factor to a more important position in the source selection 
evaluation (Graham, 2007, p. 32), meaning to separate and clearly define cost risk and 
proposal risk. Right now the source selection panels are confusing the two; “cost risk is 
meant to be a measure of the degree of difference between an offeror’s proposed cost and 
the government’s developed, most probable cost—not an identification of proposal risk” 
(p. 32). Therefore, if the government has a high-confidence cost estimate developed early 
in the acquisition process, then when it comes time to evaluate the proposals a clear price 
differential can be defined faster, thereby establishing the cost risk. “The cost-risk rating 
assesses the degree to which an offerors’s cost proposal for the contract line items 
compares with the government’s computed MPC for the same items” (p. 33). This 
practice would reduce the “conspiracy of hope” amongst industry, but requires a cultural 
and educational change amongst government personnel to understand these evaluation 
factors and the significance on the ability to make a decision based on sound business 
judgment. According to Graham,  
These recommendations will establish the expectation at the outset of 
source selection that in order to evaluate the offeror’s cost proposal and 
develop the government’s probable cost, more work will be necessary 
(both before competitive range determinations and during the ensuing 
discussion period) for the cost evaluation team to assess cost risk and 
conduct meaningful discussions with all offerors to ensure maximum 
agreement. (Graham, 2007, p. 33) 
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Appropriate use of cost risk during evaluations could effectively change how cost savings 
are recognized during pre-award. 
Another means of finding cost savings and improving best value is to reconsider 
what qualified as “technically acceptable.” Lohfeld opines in his 2012 article that 
“technically acceptable” should be a level of performance that is harder to achieve. He 
states that “setting the standards too low will let marginally acceptable bidders become 
candidates for contract award. These are the same bidders who would normally have been 
weeded out in best-value tradeoff procurements” (Lohfeld, 2012, para. 8). If all proposing 
vendors meet the minimum requirements, then those requirements were not challenging 
enough to eliminate potentially underperforming vendors. If every vendor makes it 
through the original round of eliminations (even the vendors who only marginally pass 
for acceptable), then the only factor on which they would be evaluated is price, which is 
not a responsible business decision when the performance could suffer tremendously. The 
government cannot give additional favor to a vendor that well exceeds a requirement over 
a vendor that only marginally passed; that vendor is considered at the same level as a 
marginally acceptable vendor. Therefore, raising the bar and developing requirements 
that are more difficult to achieve could be an effective way to utilize LPTA.  
Lohfeld continues to criticize FAR 15.305(a)(2), the section of the FAR dedicated 
to proposal evaluation specifically for past performance, stating that, 
When applying LPTA criteria to past performance evaluations, an offeror 
without a record of relevant past performance or for whom information on 
past performance is not available or is so sparse that no meaningful past 
performance rating can be reasonably assigned, the offeror may not be 
evaluated favorably or unfavorably on past performance (see FAR 15.305 
(a)(2)(iv)). Therefore, the offeror shall be determined to have unknown 
past performance. In the context of acceptability/unacceptability, unknown 
shall be considered acceptable. (Lohfeld, 2012) 
This pointed criticism from industry indicates that industry feels the past performance 
evaluation factor handicaps the evaluation process by lowering the technical acceptability 
bar for past performance reviews for vendors with unknown past performance. If 
“unknown” is considered “acceptable,” the acceptability rate for vendors in an acquisition 
could be unintentionally raised, causing a potentially unfair advantage for a vendor that 
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should not have been found acceptable. This problem may wane on its own as DOD 
personnel improve on CPARS reporting rates, but should be considered for new 
companies entering DOD contracting. 
Multiple opinions insist that awarding LPTA with emphasis on the low price 
nearly guarantees poor performance from the contractor. Per Lohfeld’s article,  
The satisfaction of having awarded to the lowest price offer can soon be 
overshadowed by the burden of poor contractor performance. Slow 
contract staffing is an early indicator of contractor performance problems, 
followed by marginal technical accomplishment, late deliveries, and 
ultimately cost overruns. In the long run, the lowest bidder’s performance 
reputation suffers, and the government is criticized for cost and schedule 
overruns and for failing to manage their program correctly. In the end, 
everyone loses. (Lohfeld, 2012, para. 18) 
While this is merely an opinion, it is a perception from industry that LPTA is an indicator 
that government does not value innovative solutions, nor high-quality performance. If 
industry has these perceptions, there may be indication of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
where, regardless if this opinion is true, the mere existence of that opinion in industry 
could make the hypothetical outcome a reality. The contractor decides their quality of 
performance on a contract; if there is an underlying perception by that contractor that 
LPTA means lower quality performance, there may be an increased likelihood that lower 
quality performance naturally occurs as a result. This can, however, be mitigated 
throughout the life of the contract by the active monitoring and surveillance performed by 
the government Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) appointed to the contract. 
With the help of the COR, some common ground may be found between government and 
industry perceptions of how best value is being obtained by the government, through the 
process of reporting past performance information. 
I. CONTRACTOR PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
In 2009, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) release a memorandum 
titled “Improving the Use of Contractor Performance Information” that described the 
need for a system that would hold contractors accountable for past performance. At that 
time, agencies used “fragmented methods to collect and maintain contractor performance 
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information” (OFPP, 2009, p. 1), including manual performance reviews that are kept in 
the paper contract file, or were utilizing “internal data systems that are not available to 
acquisition officers outside that agency” (p. 1). The limited distribution of performance 
information handicapped the acquisition system in that future acquisition teams were 
unable to retrieve the past performance information that could be critical in evaluating a 
contractor’s performance history. In this memorandum, the FAR was officially changed 
effective July 1, 2009 to require agencies to submit an electronic record of contractor 
performance in the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), which is a 
web-based system that serves as “the single, government-wide repository for contractor 
performance information” (p. 1).  
In 2004, the report-building system CPARS was developed by the Navy and 
became the mandatory system for capturing past performance in the DOD (Guidance, 
2014). CPARS is a web-enabled system designed to host a history of contractor 
performance on specific contracts, as submitted by the receiver of the contractor’s 
supplies or services. CPARS is a system of processes that assists the assessing official in 
assembling a review of a contractor’s performance based on various limited elements, 
including quality of the product/service, schedule quality, ability to control cost, quality 
of business relations, utilization of small business, and key personnel management, as 
relevant to the specific contract (Guidance, 2014).  
The reporting process is designed to be fair and objective. The assessing official 
or contracting officer assembles a submission to the CPARS system that provides an 
evaluation of the contractor’s performance for the various elements. The draft report 
created in CPARS is sent to the contractor, who is allowed 30 days to respond to the 
report and provide comments or rebuttals for the information. The contractor’s response 
is reviewed by the assessing official and is given time to revise the original assessment 
and narrative accordingly; if there is a disagreement with the assessment, a government 
official one level above the assessing official organizationally will review and finalize the 
assessment (Guidance, 2014, p. 25–26). 
Prior to establishment of major past performance review systems (like PPIRS), 
past performance information needed for source selection review boards was so 
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unreliable that Source Selection Evaluation Boards (SSEBs) met the delivered data with 
skepticism and distrust. The unreliability of that data was based on lack of standardized 
reporting measures for documenting and filing past performance data. Further, when it 
was finally launched, PPIRS lacked oversight and management. Lack of accountability, 
unclear system metrics and tools, and varying definitions for rating factors contributed to 
overall frustration with the past performance reporting process. The first hurdle is to get 
data on past performance, the second is to ensure that the data is reliable, and the third is 
to use that data appropriately to make source selection decisions; if the data cannot be 
trusted, then it cannot be used, and an entire evaluation factor’s opportunity is wasted. 
Annie Meeks discusses the concept of oversight in the post-award phase of 
contracting in her 2011 NCMA article, “The Buck Stops…Where?: Post-Award 
Accountability for Large Service Contracts.” She argues that without sufficient contract 
oversight, knowledge is lost and minor problems go undetected and become major 
problems if not crises. Meeks reviews the three necessary levels of oversight for thorough 
contract management, maintained by both government and contractor: 
• Quality Control: the plan designed by the Contractor, enforced by the 
Contractor, to review quality of performance; 
• Quality Assurance: the plan for review of Contractor performance, 
enforced by the Government, to review quality of Contractor performance; 
• Quality Oversight: the plan for review of Government evaluation of 
Contractor performance, enforced by the Government, to review how the 
Government’s processes are being enforced to review Contractor 
performance. 
(Meeks, 2011, p. 37) 
When both the government and the contractor are held responsible for contract oversight, 
fewer details are missed in performance evaluations, quality is maintained in accordance 
with contract requirements, and reporting via the necessary channels and systems is used 
to benefit future evaluations. 
In all best value evaluations, evaluation factors must clear, measurable, given 
weight, and understood by all parties. When the government was evaluating contractor 
performance and either party did not understand that which was being evaluated or the 
factors being utilized, resources would be wasted in the discussions over what was being 
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entered into official record (if anything was being entered). Without oversight for a 
system that maintains past performance information, there is no incentive to create 
records of past performance. Without past performance information, future source 
selection evaluation boards go without pertinent information to make quality best value 
decisions. The qualifications of the COR should therefore be adequate for the work they 
are performing. The COR needs not only to intimate technical knowledge of the work 
being performed to be able to adequately convey a comprehensive review of that 
performance; “staff should be subject matter experts trained in the observation of tasks 
and factual measurement techniques” (Meeks, 2011, p. 38). CORs should also have the 
work ethic to physically perform the oversight and surveillance responsibilities of COR 
to ensure that evaluation of service provider work is thorough and reliable. COR training 
provides appropriate theoretical application of COR skills, but only through repetitive 
practice and thorough understanding of performance evaluation factors can post-award 
evaluation provide appropriate data that reflects the quality desired when the best value 
processes were developed during source selection. 
“Especially in this era of economic recession, service providers and government 
agencies cannot afford to waste time, money, and resources on failed service delivery 
contracts,” (Meeks, 2011, p. 42) particularly when the goal of best value processes was to 
gain more outcome without more dollars. Without proper evaluation of contract 
performance, there is no firm way of knowing whether the government received what it 
paid for. While the U.S. is currently emerging from a recession, the defense budget cuts 
are growing in size and as a result, contract management teams must operate with limited 
resources. Therefore, once the contract has been awarded utilizing the evaluation method 
that best suits the government’s interest, effective contract management must be 
performed to ensure that contractors are delivering on their requirements. Undelivered 
requirements are indicative of taxpayer dollar waste, even more so than dollars lost in 
evaluations and negotiations. 
GAO Report 09-374, Federal Contractors: Better Performance Information 
Needed to Support Agency Award Decisions, suggested that the Administrator of the 
OFPP work to:  
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• Standardize evaluation factors and rating scales government-wide for 
documenting contractor performance; 
• Establish policy for documenting performance-related not currently 
captured in PPIRS (like terminations, subcontractor management, and 
other pertinent measurements); 
• Define government-wide roles and responsibilities for managing and 
overseeing PPIRS data; 
• Develop system tools and metrics for agencies to use in monitoring and 
managing the documenting of contractor performance; 
• Take appropriate action to finalize proposed changes to the FAR that 
clarify responsibilities and performance documentation requirements for 
contract orders, including those against the GSA multiple award schedule. 
(GAO, 2009, p. 21) 
OFPP designated CPARS as the single government-wide system for entering 
evaluations, and by October 2010 all agencies had transitioned to using CPARS. The 
CPARS Guide has standardized definitions for ratings, which has thus addressed the 
issue identified in GAO Report 09-374 of ratings having unclear definitions. 
The GAO reported an increase in compliance metrics in 2013 in GAO Report 13-
589, DOD Actions to Improve the Reporting of Past Performance Information, from 56 
to 74 percent from October 2011 through April 2013 (GAO, 2013, p. 2). While timeliness 
of the reports continues to be an issue, the improvement in report completion is a step 
forward for improving past performance tracking for major contract actions. Source 
selection evaluations that depend on reliable CPARS reporting therefore have some hope 
that the culture in the acquisition environment is gaining stronger reverence for past 
performance information, and will make stronger strides to comply with regulations 
dictating proper reporting. 
It was reported in the GAO Report 14-707, Contractor Performance: Actions 
Taken to Improve Reporting of Past Performance Information, that “Section 806 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2012 required DOD to develop a 
strategy to ensure that evaluations in past performance databases used for making source 
selection decisions are complete, timely and accurate” (GAO, 2014a, p. 7). The OFPP 
had worked with the Integrated Award Environment, the CPARS program office and an 
interagency working group to update the CPARS guide (which was released in November 
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2012), and the FAR Council agreed to revise the FAR in September 2013 to “enhance 
various elements of documenting contractor performance,” including:  
• Standards for timeliness (must be completed within 120 days of the end of 
evaluation period) 
• Standards for completeness (including minimum evaluation factors to be 
completed) 
• Assigning responsibility for completeness of evaluations (default is the 
KO, but the requiring agency is responsible for establishing roles and 
responsibilities for CPARS reporting) 
• Management accountability (agencies are required to evaluate compliance 
and assign responsibility for CPARS reporting) 
• Ensuring past performance submissions are consistent with award fee 
evaluations (award and incentive fee evaluations are to be included as part 
of the past performance evaluations) 
(GAO, 2014a, p. 8) 
While the DOD has generally improved its CPARS reporting, the rate of 
improvement varies by agency. From April 2013 to April 2014, the DOD only improved 
by 7% (from 76% compliance rate to 83% compliance rate, based on contracts with 
dollar thresholds that are generally higher than the simplified acquisition threshold) 
(GAO, 2014a, p.10). DOD has the highest compliance rate amongst the top ten agencies 
that perform the most federal contracting. While any improvement is progress, this still 
means that for contracts below the SAT there is less stringent regulation for CPARS 
reporting. Furthermore, the reporting for contracts above the SAT, the compliance is still 
only at 83%, meaning that approximately 17% of the larger contracts have CPARS 
reports that are not being filed, past performance metrics not being captured, and an 
immeasurable number of future source selections are going without that data. 
Past performance information is essential to bolster the probability for successful 
future contracts. Regardless of whether the reviews are positive of negative, the 
information is valuable for source selection boards looking to make decisions on their 
future acquisitions based on the reviews from contractor’s past work. DOD is pursuing 
new and inventive means of streamlining vendor selection based on the quality of past 
contract performance. In 2014 Elliot Branch, Deputy Assistance Secretary of the Navy 
(Acquisition and Procurement) released a memorandum announcing the Superior 
Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP): 
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“The Superior Supplier Incentive Program is a pilot program to incentivize 
contactor performance by recognizing exceptional contractor conduct in 
the areas of cost, schedule, performance, quality, and business relations. 
The program assesses three years’ worth of data, using the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS)” 
(Branch, 2014, p, 1). 
In June 2014, the Army began employing the SSIP and released its own list of 30 
vendors, broken out into three tiers (Tier 1 being the best), and released the list to the 
public (Clark, 2014). The goal of the SSIP is to incentivize contractors to achieve 
exceptional performance that will ideally be reflected in the CPARS report. The problem 
with the SSIP design is that CPARS is currently under- and improperly utilized by the 
DOD. Success of the SSIP test program is dependent upon reliable CPARS reporting. If 
the quality of CPARS reporting increases over time, there is reason to believe that the 
SSIP test program could evolve into a beneficial tool for the DOD. 
J. SUMMARY 
This chapter contains a review of the available literature relevant to source 
selection methodologies and the best value continuum, proper utilization of non-cost 
factors, and increasing use of LPTA. The modern acquisition workforce was discussed in 
terms of experience, knowledge, and comfort with best value procurements, as well as the 
need for acquisition education. Government best value contracting reform was explored, 
as well as criticisms from industry of government source selection practices. Past 
performance information and its importance for future acquisition was discussed, to pave 
the way for its importance in the outcomes of contracts for this research. The next chapter 
will review the methodology for this study, including a brief overview of the contracting 
systems used to gather reports and data, how the contract data was acquired, description 
of the data, descriptive statistics, and data issues.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This section will explain the sources and methods for collecting contractual data 
used in this study, as well as the goal for establishing the relationship between the choice 
of source selection methodology (either lowest price technically acceptable or tradeoff) 
and the resultant measure of success of the contract (the CPARS average rating). This 
chapter will review the methodology for this study, including a brief overview of the 
contracting systems used to gather reports and data, how the contract data was acquired, 
description of the data, descriptive statistics, and data issues. 
A. PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE ENTERPRISE INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
Within the Department of the Army there are six Secretariats, one of which is 
ASA (ALT). ASA(ALT) sustains the mission to “provide our Soldiers a decisive 
advantage in any mission by maintaining quality acquisition professionals to develop, 
acquire, field, and sustain the world’s best equipment and services through efficient 
leveraging of technologies and capabilities to meet current and future Army needs” 
(“Mission Statement,” n.d.). There are twelve major program executive offices within the 
Office of the ASA(ALT), one of which is PEO EIS. 
The PEO EIS is a $3.5 billion Army organization comprised of 34 acquisition 
programs (“About PEO EIS,” n.d., para. 2). Each program office employs military, 
government civilians and contractor support. PEO EIS leads the Army in development 
and implementation of major information technology (IT) systems in multiple fields, 
including business management, enterprise resource planning (ERP), biometrics, 
personnel, training, communications, infrastructure, audit readiness, logistics and 
financial management (“About PEO EIS,” n.d., para. 2). 
PEO EIS typically purchases COTS major IT business systems on a competitive 
basis. In a $3.5 billion portfolio of programs, the contract negotiations can be extensive, 
and the significance of the tax dollars spent is not taken lightly. The Better Buying Power 
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initiatives are employed to the fullest extent possible, and garnering the best value for the 
Soldier is the goal of every PEO EIS procurement. 
For this study, contracts awarded for PEO EIS will be sampled for evaluation of 
the outcomes of the contract against the best value methodology utilized for evaluation 
during competition to best evaluate how the Army is currently utilizing best value 
methods for complex IT contracts. 
B. ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING SYSTEMS 
The current contracting environment requires copious amounts of paperwork and 
data tracking. The best means for managing contracts, particularly of the larger variety, is 
to utilize electronic contracting systems and data repositories, many of which limit access 
only to those with a need to know, or those directly involved with the acquisition. This 
section will briefly discuss the individual electronic contracting systems that were 
accessed for data during this study. 
(1) Virtual Contracting Enterprise 
The Virtual Contracting Enterprise (VCE) is a suite of web-based contracting 
tools developed and owned by ACC for use by its employees and their customers in the 
performance of their daily duties acquiring supplies and services for the U.S. Army 
(“VCE Mission,” n.d.). The suite of tools includes a Business Intelligence Metrics & 
Reporting (VCE-BI) module out of which ad-hoc reports can be generated that compile 
contractual information for a limited number of data fields. The VCE-BI module has the 
ability to pull data from FPDS-NG and the VCE-Acquisition Management module 
(which contains detailed contract data beyond the information captured in the Contract 
Action Report [CAR] for FPDS-NG).  
(2) Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 
The Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) contains 
contractual data for contract actions with estimated values of $3,000 or more, or that may 
be $3,000 or more, including every modification to that contract (“About FPDS-NG,” 
n.d.). The contract data captured on a CAR, which is completed by the Contracting 
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Officer after each contract action, is stored in FPDS-NG, and fed to other outside 
systems, including VCE. 
(3) Paperless Contract Files 
The Paperless Contract Files (PCF) system is a module within VCE that is a 
complete document management, storage and workflow solution for the contracting 
workforce at ACC. PCF was developed by ACC to assist the contracting workforce to 
manage immense amounts of documents contained in a traditional contract file in one 
place. PCF is a secure, web-based application that can be accessed by the contracting 
workforce at ACC, and archives historical files that were originated in the system by a 
member of ACC. Electronic contract file documents were retrieved from PCF to create a 
digital contract file that was reviewed to obtain the data for this research. 
(4) Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System 
CPARS is a web-enabled system designed to host a history of contractor 
performance on specific contracts, as submitted by the receiver of the contractor’s 
supplies or services. CPARS is a system of processes that assists the assessing official in 
assembling a review of a contractor’s performance based on various limited elements, 
including quality of the product/service, schedule quality, ability to control cost, quality 
of business relations, utilization of small business, and key personnel management, as 
relevant to the specific contract.  The primary purpose of the CPARS is to ensure that 
current, complete and accurate information on contractor performance is available for use 
in procurement source selections (Guidance, 2014, p. 13). 
According to the CPARS Guide, and FAR Part 42.15, CPARS reports are 
required for any action in excess of the Simplified Acquisition Threshold, and over $1M 
for Information Technology (see Figure 2) (Guidance, 2014, p. 21). CPARS is meant to 
capture data for unclassified contracts only.  
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Figure 2.  Business Sector, Dollar Threshold and Reviewing Official 
(from CPARS, 2014) 
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Dollar thresholds are applied to the aggregate value of the contract action; 
therefore if a contract is modified over time to increase the total dollar value, then if the 
new value exceeds the threshold, a CPARS report is required. If a contract were to 
remain below that threshold, however, the CPARS report is not required. By only 
requiring past performance information for larger dollar procurements, countless smaller 
dollar procurements go unevaluated. Therefore, this study reviews CPARS reports 
specifically for contracts related to IT with contract values greater than $1M for PEO EIS 
in order to have a higher likelihood of obtaining a complete CPARS report. 
C. COLLECTION OF CONTRACT DATA 
This section will discuss the criteria utilized to assemble a list of eligible contracts 
for this study, as well as the data collected from those contracts. 
1. Criteria for VCE Report 
Ad-hoc reporting, in terms of business intelligence reports, refers to a report that 
is assembled “as the occasion requires” based on the needs of the end-user. For this study 
a report was generated with the following criteria: 
• C-Type Contracts (later re-ran the report to include all types of contracts, 
as PEO EIS has fewer C-type contracts) 
• Closed between 2001 and 2014 (for greater likelihood for completed 
CPARS reports) 
• Above the SAT 
• Best value method listed (LPTA or tradeoff) (later re-ran the report to 
disregard this field, as the VCE-Acquisition Management module was not 
required until 2012, indicating that this field does not capture 100% of 
contract files for the specified time range) 
This report was provided by the VCE data helpdesk based on PEO EIS contract 
data that was entered into FPDS-NG from CAR reports created by contracting officers 
for the respective contract actions. The resulting report of 124 contract actions were 
deemed acceptable potential files for this project. The list of contracts was sent to the 
leadership at ACC-Rock Island Contracting Center at the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois 
and to the ACC-New Jersey Contracting Center at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey, as 
these two contracting centers facilitate in the majority of PEO EIS major contract actions. 
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The files that were retrievable from the electronic systems were provided and evaluated 
for information in accordance with the aforementioned data fields. 
2. Data Collection Rubric 
The data collection rubric was designed to capture 96 potential data points that are 
typically found in complex contract actions. The five categories of data collected 
included: 
• Basic Contract Information 
• Acquisition Complexity 
• Environmental Factors 
• Outcome Variables 
• Other 
Basic Contract Information included the contract number, name of the project, 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code and Product Service Code 
(PSC). 
Acquisition Complexity measured the complexity of the procurement with fields 
such as the use of LPTA or tradeoff, number and type of evaluation factors, the FAR 
section employed in the acquisition (FAR Part 12, 13 or 15), use of incentives, etc. This 
data created a broad understanding of the difficulty of the acquisition, the technicality of 
forethought on the part of the acquisition team, and lead into evaluating the 
environmental factors. 
Environmental Factors took measure of the circumstances that surrounded the 
source selection, such as number of reviews of the proposals, number of personnel on the 
source selection team, the quality of the file documentation. This data created a broad 
understanding of the involvedness of the acquisition team in the procurement and the 
difficulties that may have occurred in selecting a vendor. 
Outcome Variables included the measurements pulled from the CPARS reports 
(Cost, Quality, etc.), Earned Value Management (EVM), where applicable, whether or 
not a protest took place, and other such measurements of contract outcomes. This data 
was important to connect to the complexity of the acquisition to find a potential cause-
and-effect relationship between the complexity, the method, and the outcomes of either 
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LPTA or tradeoff. Other data fields captured included number of Evaluation Notices, 
Clarification Requests, and Deficiency Reports. 
D. DATA DESCRIPTION 
This study is aiming to establish whether the CPARS ratings are impacted by the 
choice of LPTA or tradeoff methods during source selection evaluation.  
The Dependent Variable (DV) is the outcome or effect of a change in the 
Independent Variable (IV), the input or cause in the equation. For this analysis the 
CPARS rating and the PALT are the DVs. PALT is the calculation of the time leading up 
to award (in days), starting at the time the requirements package is received by the 
contracting office. The CPARS ratings are a proxy measure of contract success or failure, 
based upon the reviews provided by the customer. CPARS ratings are provided by the 
assessing official in the CPARS report cards for areas such as Cost, Quality and 
Schedule, ranging from Unsatisfactory (not meeting the standard contractual 
expectations) to Excellent (exceeding contractual expectations). The ratings are given in 
Likert-style responses where 1=Unsatisfactory, 2=Marginal, 3=Satisfactory, 4=Very 
Good, and 5=Excellent. For this study the overall CPARS score was calculated by 
averaging the following CPARS factors: quality, schedule, management of key 
personnel, and small business use. The average score was used because of the limited 
sample size; for future research with larger sample sizes each CPARS rating could be 
used individually to measure contract success or failure in each rating category. In this 
case, both individual and combined CPARS scores were used (note: individual scores 
were examined without success due to data limitations). Specifically, differences in 
CPARS rating between LPTA and tradeoff acquisition strategies were sought by 
examining CPARS quality ratings, cost ratings, and CPARS business relationship rating 
individually, and also by looking for differences using the average CPARS rating for 
each acquisition (in other words, the average of quality, cost and business relationship 
scores).  
The independent variable (IV) is the choice of utilizing either LPTA or tradeoff 
method, as this variable is determined by the acquisition team and therefore could impact 
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the DV. The acquisition team chooses LPTA or tradeoff prior to RFP release and source 
selection evaluation. The IV is labeled LPTATO and it is a binary variable where 
0=LPTA and 1=tradeoff.  
Finally, there is one covariate variable. Covariates are secondary variables that 
can also affect the relationship of primary interest: the relationship between the IV and 
the DV. Specifically, covariates are variables other than the independent variable that 
potentially affect the outcome variable, or DV. In this case, the covariate is contract 
dollar value (VALUE), and it is a continuous variable. The dollar value of a contract 
affects the number of reviews it has to go through, thus affecting the PALT. Higher dollar 
contracts typically endure more reviews, and thus have longer PALTs. The opposite is 
typically true for lower dollar value contracts. In this case, the goal is to parcel out the 
effect of the covariate VALUE in order to more clearly see the effect the contracting 
methodology (LPTATO) has on the outcome variables (PALT and CPARS ratings).  
The goal of this analysis is to see if there is a cause-effect relationship between 
the choice of evaluation method and the PALT and CPARS ratings. This analysis will 
measure whether there is a relationship between the DVs and the IV, and the degree of 
strength or significance of that relationship. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the methodology for this study, including a brief 
overview of the contracting systems used to gather reports and data, how the contract 
data was acquired, description of the data, descriptive statistics, and data issues. The next 
chapter discusses the data analysis and findings. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter explains the data analysis and statistical findings that resulted from 
the assessment. Explanation of the statistical methods used, assumptions applied to 
normalize the data, analysis, and whether or not the research questions were answered are 
discussed. 
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Basic descriptive statistics for each variable are shown in Table 1. The table 
presents three figures for each variable: (1) the total for all the data, (2) the total for 




Table 1.   Descriptive Statistics for Data Set 
B. DATA ISSUES 
The report that was retrieved from VCE contained a number of contract files that 
were originated at the Army Contracting Command, National Capital Region (ACC-
NCR), which cased its colors and closed on July 11, 2013 (Gore, 2013). The contract 
files that were originated at ACC-NCR for PEO EIS were not fully accessible as those 
files were not consistently stored in the PCF module prior to the closure of the 
contracting center. Therefore, a significant portion of data that may have assisted in this 
research was not accessible. This project, therefore, is an incomplete analysis of 
acquisition history for PEO EIS, given the recent migration to utilizing a new group of 
contracting centers since 2013. This limitation on data collection should be considered 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max  
PALT 
(days) 
8 256.88 392.16 50 1216 ALL DATA TOTAL 
3 156.33 94.56 50 231 LPTA 




19 3.47 .96 1 5 ALL DATA TOTAL 
14 3.50 1.02 1 5 LPTA 




9 3.56 1.13 1 5 ALL DATA TOTAL 
8 3.88 .64 3 5 LPTA 





19 3.42 .96 1 5 ALL DATA TOTAL 
14 3.43 1.02 1 5 LPTA 





19 3.42 .99 1 5 ALL DATA TOTAL 
14 3.45 1.01 1 5 LPTA 
5 3.27 1.01 2.33 5 TRADEOFF 
VALUE 
(dollars) 
19 $3,536,880 $4,263,114 $13,370 $17,800,000 ALL DATA TOTAL 
14 $2,639,221 $2,851,057 $13,370 $7,700,654 LPTA 
5 $6,050,324 $6,681,982 $1,613,496 $17,800,000 TRADEOFF 
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throughout the study; future research could benefit from gathering contractual data for 
longer than two years from a relatively new contracting organization. 
The documentation for the files that were electronically accessible was sparse, 
indicating that multiple contracting professionals had worked the actions without a single 
point responsible for complete contract file management, resulting in relatively 
incomplete electronic contract files. The factor of human error should be considered here, 
as internal controls are not wholly monitoring the management of complete contract files 
within the system. Internal controls for historical data filing are another issue for potential 
future research.  
With only 19 cases, the sample size is small. Power calculations suggest the need 
for 14 cases for each contracting methodology (i.e., 14 LPTA cases and 14 tradeoff 
cases) in order to achieve adequate power (α = .05, β = .80). The data are unbalanced 
with respect to the number of cases for each contracting methodology. There are 14 
LPTA cases and 5 tradeoff cases. This unbalanced design can cause ambiguity about the 
mean as the intercept and make assignment of sums of squares more difficult. There are, 
however, solutions to these issues. A weighted mean can be used in place of the grand 
mean (normally the intercept in a balanced design), and the Stata software (version 12.1) 
automatically handles the assignment of the sums of squares. Thus, we proceeded with 
our analysis despite these issues.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
Because the intent is to analyze differences in contract outcomes (PALT and 
CPARS ratings) based on contracting methodology (LPTA or tradeoff), a group 
comparison statistical methodology is necessary. In other words, the contracting 
methodologies are divided into two groups (LPTA and tradeoff), and analyzed to find if 
there are differences in contract outcomes (PALT and CPARS ratings) by group. 
A technique called multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was initially 
used to assess group differences. Results could not be obtained given the high collinearity 
between the variables. In the case of MANCOVA, collinearity occurs when the 
dependent variables are very highly correlated with each other, to the point of being 
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indistinguishable from each other. The general rule of thumb is that dependent variables 
correlated at .80 or higher are likely to be collinear (Dattalo, 2013). In this case, all of the 
dependent variables are correlated at .78 or higher, preventing accurate analysis.  
Given the existing collinearity, each of the dependent variables was examined 
separately. In other words, differences in contract outcomes (PALT and CPARS ratings) 
were sought out individually. Although multivariate methods like MANCOVA paint a 
more complete picture of the relationships between contracting strategy (LPTA or 
tradeoff) and subsequent outcomes, univariate techniques can also help piece that picture 
together, albeit in a fragmented way. Thus post-hoc analyses were performed in which 
PALT and CPARS ratings were analyzed separately. Again, because the outcome 
variables were assessed individually, the methodology changed from a multivariate test 
(MANCOVA) to a univariate test, known simply as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). 
ANCOVA addresses the following questions: Are mean differences among the 
groups (after adjusting for covariate effects) likely to have occurred by chance? Taken 
from another angle, is there a significant difference between the mean value for DVs 
(PALT and CPARS ratings) in the LPTA acquisitions versus the mean value for DVs 
(PALT and CPARS ratings) in the tradeoff acquisitions once the effect of the covariate 
(contract dollar value, referred to as VALUE) has been parceled out? ANCOVA 
examines the relationships between the dependent variables (PALT and CPARS ratings) 
and the independent variable (choice of LPTA or tradeoff methodology) while taking into 
account the effect the covariate (VALUE) might have on the outcome variables (PALT 
and CPARS ratings).  
D. ASSUMPTION TESTING 
Before conducting the ANCOVA, certain assumptions about the data were tested. 
First, univariate normality was assessed by performing the Shapiro-Wilk test to check 
whether a sample came from a normally distributed population. Both PALT and contract 
value (VALUE) were deemed to be non-normal. Both variables were normalized via a 
logarithmic transformation. Both variables passed the Shapiro-Wilk normality test once 
transformed. 
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Second, linearity was assessed by examining scatter plots of the dependent 
variables (PALT and CPARS ratings) and the covariate variable (VALUE). The plots 
revealed linear relationships between the variables. 
Third, homogeneity of regression was assessed by performing an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA, which is similar to an ANCOVA but does not contain a covariate 
variable) that included the independent variable (LPTA or tradeoff), the covariate 
VALUE, and the interaction between the independent variable and the covariate. The 
interaction term was not significant, which indicates that the relationship between the 
dependent variables (PALT and CPARS ratings) and covariate (VALUE) is the same at 
both levels of the independent variable (LPTA or tradeoff). Hence, the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression is upheld. 
Finally, homogeneity of variance between groups was assessed using Bartlett’s 
Test. For most of the outcome variables, the results showed the differences in variance 
among the groups (LPTA and tradeoff) are not significant, thus the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance is upheld. The contract’s Cost rating (i.e., the CPARS rating 
that assesses cost performance of the contractor using a Likert-type scale) only had one 
case for the tradeoff methodology (8 cases for the LPTA methodology), thus 
homogeneity of variance could not be adequately assessed for that outcome variable. 
E. RESULTS 
The results of the analysis show that the only situation where source selection 
methodology (LPTA or tradeoff) produced significantly different contracting outcomes 
was in the case of the contractor’s CPARS cost rating. Essentially, the cost rating is lower 
for tradeoff contracts. However, because there was only one tradeoff case, these results 
cannot be relied on with any firm accuracy. More cases are needed to confirm these 
results, as will be addressed in Chapter V regarding areas for further research. Table 2 




Table 2.   Analysis of the Covariance Using CPARS Cost Rating as the DV 
F. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Perhaps more telling from this sample are the relationships between the variables 
themselves. The correlations are shown in Table 3.  
 




Source Partial SS^ df MS^^ F Prob > F 
Model 7.57 2 3.79 8.57 .0174* 
LogVALUE .23 1 .23 .51 .5020 ns 
LPTATO 6.39 1 6.39 14.48 .0089** 
Residual 2.65 6 .44   
Total 10.22 8 1.28   
* p<.05 ** p<.01  
^ Partial sum of squares ^^ Mean square 
Number of Observations = 9 
Root Mean Squared Error = .66 
R2 = .7408 
Adjusted R2 = .6544 
 









PALT 1.00       
CPARS 
Avg -0.78 1.00      
CPARS 
Quality -0.94 0.94 1.00     
CPARS 
Cost -0.78 1.00 0.94 1.00    
CPARS 
Bus Rel -0.88 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.00   
LPTATO^ 0.99 -0.82 -0.96 -0.82 -0.90 1.00  
VALUE 0.95 -0.87 -0.95 -0.87 -0.92 0.93 1.00 
^Point biserial correlation because LPTATO is a binary variable where  
0 = LPTA and 1 = tradeoff 
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The items in the table with a correlation coefficient +0.70 between the variable in 
the first column and the variables in the column headers indicates a strong positive linear 
relationship between those two variables. There appears to be a strong positive linear 
relationship between LPTATO and PALT (.99) and contract value and PALT (.95). This 
relationship is most likely due to the notion that complex, higher dollar contracts take a 
longer time to award; therefore, tradeoff acquisitions (LPTATO = 1) take more time to 
award (an increased PALT time). 
The items in the table with a correlation coefficient -0.70 between the variable in 
the first column and the variables in the column headers indicates a strong negative linear 
relationship between those two variables. There appears to be a strong negative linear 
relationship between the CPARS ratings and PALT (valuing from -.78 to -.88 to -.94 for 
Cost, Business Relationship and Quality, respectively, with the correlation between the 
average CPARS scores and PALT being -.78), suggesting that the CPARS ratings decline 
as the PALT (days) increases. This relationship might indicate that even with increased 
time dedicated to a procurement, there is no guarantee that the CPARS ratings will 
improve. PALT can be increased due to bureaucratic levels of process reviews that do not 
add value, therefore PALT is not always an indicator of increased quality in the product 
(the acquisition package). A low-quality acquisition package may lead to confusion 
between the government and the contractor regarding deliverables, thereby resulting in 
lower CPARS ratings. Likewise, the shorter PALT could be the result of simple LPTA 
acquisitions (also known for low complexity, clear requirements), therefore positive 
CPARS rating are easier to achieve. An increase in data could lend more insight to this 
relationship and confirm these notions. 
After the original correlations were analyzed, analysis was performed on the 
relationships between the LPTA acquisitions and the CPARS outcomes (see results in 











PALT 1      
CPARS 
Quality 0.29 1     




0.29 1 1 1   
CPARS 0.29 1 1 1 1  
Value 0.6555 -0.5326 -0.5326 -0.5326 -0.5326 1 
Table 4.   Correlations When LPTA Methodology Was Chosen 
The data in Table 4 shows that the relationship between and PALT and CPARS 
for LPTA acquisitions is 0.29, indicating a moderately positive linear relationship.  This 
indicates that for acquisitions with a longer PALT time, the CPARS rating may be better, 
possibly the result of better efforts being applied to the contract setup leading to better 
contractor performance overall. There is a negative relationship between the contract 
value and the CPARS ratings for the LPTA acquisitions, suggesting that higher dollar 
LPTA contracts are not viewed to be as successful as lower dollar LPTA contracts (in 
terms of CPARS ratings).  
The relationship between PALT and contract value for LPTA acquisitions is a 
stronger positive relationship at 0.65, perhaps a result of the complexity of the contract – 
the higher the dollar value on the contract, the more complex the contract, the longer the 
PALT. 
Analysis was also performed on the relationships between the tradeoff 
acquisitions and the CPARS outcomes (see results in Table 5). In Table 5, the CPARS 
Cost rating was removed because there was only one value, resulting in skewed statistics 












PALT 1     
CPARS 




-0.2594 1 1   
CPARS -0.5243 0.9584 0.9584 1  
Value 0.9836 -0.3712 -0.3712 -0.6181 1 
Table 5.   Correlations When Tradeoff Methodology Was Chosen 
As discussed previously, the relationship between PALT and contract value for 
tradeoff acquisitions is a stronger positive relationship at 0.9836, almost a perfect 
relationship. This may be, again, a result of the complexity of the contract. 
There is a negative linear relationship between the PALT and the CPARS ratings 
for tradeoff acquisitions, at -0.2594, indicating that as the PALT increases the CPARS 
ratings for quality and business relationships decrease. There could be multiple causes for 
this pattern. A longer PALT is indicative of a potentially lengthy resultant contract. A 
long contract term with negative ratings could be indicative of an increasingly stressful 
work environment, or drawn-out contentious disputing over deliverables. Longer contract 
terms offer more chances for the government COR to witness positive, but also negative, 
aspects of the contractor’s performance, leading to negative performance reviews. The 
CPARS reports would need to be reviewed in depth to find answers for this relationship. 
G. SUMMARY 
This section discussed the data analysis and statistical findings that resulted from 
this study, and the statistical methods and assumptions employed to calculate and these 
results. A number of post-hoc analyses were employed to further understand the data. 
These additional analyses revealed positive and negative correlational relationships 
between covariate and outcome variables. The next and final chapter of this study 
discusses the conclusions and recommendations based on these findings. 
 54 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 55 
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the concepts and findings from this 
study. This chapter will discuss the managerial implications of the results found in 
Chapter IV, answer the research questions posited at the beginning of this study, and 
make recommendations for future research. This study only scratches the surface of best 
value application in the Army, and has ultimately raised more questions for future 
research. 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of this project was to determine whether or not there is a relationship in 
U.S. Army contracts between the method of procurement (LPTA or tradeoff) and the 
quality of the contract outcomes, in this case measured by evaluation of CPARS reports 
and PALT. This goal was met, to a degree, given the challenges of limited data and 
influence of other factors on statistical significance. Further experimentation is necessary 
to determine if the results of this experiment are applicable across the Army and the 
DOD.  
Source selection methodologies along the best value continuum are used 
extensively in defense contracting, but the extent to which acquisition personnel 
understand how to appropriately use best value may be limited. While GAO reports show 
that most high-cost defense acquisitions are utilizing best value, there is indication that 
non-cost evaluation factors are not being used to their full potential. If requirements are 
well-written and there is low risk for contract performance, then LPTA is often the best 
process. If the government has prioritized non-cost factors to be equal to or greater than 
the cost in terms of important, or is seeking innovative solutions, then tradeoff is typically 
the best process. Non-cost factors can be monetized when necessary, and by doing so the 
risk for a protest based on subjectivity can be mitigated. By monetizing even non-cost 
factors there is room to justify an acquisition decision, thereby putting fears of protest at 
ease. The government acquisition team must be honest and thorough when developing 
the requirements and priorities of an acquisition. Determining priorities of cost and non-
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cost factors on the best value continuum are the lynchpin to a successful evaluation. All 
parties should be cognizant of the pressures to make a timely award, reducing costs, 
reducing risks, limited resources, as all are factors that can very much inhibit a successful 
evaluation and make all efforts to disallow their encumbrance on the evaluation. 
Government and industry have conflicting perceptions of best value, how it is 
used and what it offers. While government views best value as a means to get the most 
for a dollar, industry realizes that best value, when improperly used, often results in 
conflicting information during negotiations, “low-cost, low-quality,” or instances in 
which cost becomes a “negligible” factor in evaluations (Biddle, 1993, p. 128). The DOD 
has made strides with Better Buying Power and other efforts to reform best value 
contracting, but industry continues to find areas for improvement in the contract 
management process. While efforts have been made to bridge this conflict, all can agree 
that if the principles of best value are improperly applied that the results can be disastrous 
for private industry and for the taxpayer. 
There is a lingering need for acquisition education in the DOD workforce. DAU 
has made marked improvement on acquisition education, but theoretical information is 
only so helpful; on-the-job training is valued by many to be the most valuable source of 
obtaining acquisition education, particularly for source selections. With the increasing 
defense mission and dwindling resources of time, money and people, however, there just 
is not enough guidance to assist the workforce in achieving source selection 
enlightenment. The Better Buying Power mantra of “do more without more” has been 
pushed beyond doing more with fewer dollars into performing more acquisitions with 
fewer manpower resources. The lack of resources is also resulting in a shift to using 
LPTA more often than tradeoff purely because LPTA requires fewer resources to 
accomplish the same mission. As more stress is put on the acquisition process, there is 
higher risk for making poor business decisions. If the best value processes are used 
appropriately and with proper intent, the government has the highest chance to receive 
the best value for the taxpayer dollars. This study therefore aims to determine whether 
there is a likelihood for better contract performance outcome using a particular evaluation 
process. The goal is to provide the acquisition workforce with better expectations for 
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post-award performance, so that it may be considered when choosing the most 
appropriate source selection process. 
Post-award evaluation to build past performance is the often forgotten but 
increasing crucial phase of contracting. Once the contract has been awarded there is little 
concern for how the performance will be evaluated or what happens to that information. 
For years the evaluation factors had been unclear and contractor performance reviews 
used factors that were vague, and the reports were ultimately not appropriately filed due 
to a mismanaged system with no oversight or direction. After GAO investigations, the 
CPARS and PPIRS systems were finally put on track and government agencies have 
made strides in proper reporting techniques. Performance information is valuable for 
future acquisitions for the same reasons as other non-cost factors—the reliability of the 
information provides prized data that can mean the difference for reducing risk for future 
contractor poor performance. If past performance information is weighted as more 
important than cost, then a tradeoff evaluation would rely wholly on the quality of that 
past performance information, at which time it would be helpful if the information 
captured in CPARS was not only present but also reliable. As substantial projects, such as 
the SSIP test program, depend more heavily on accurate and reliable CPARS reporting, 
there is likelihood that this data could become more trustworthy over time. 
The confirmed statistical relationships between the choice of source selection 
methodology and contract outcomes was inconclusive given the design of this 
experiment. More data is needed to confirm beyond refute that there is a relationship 
between the choice of utilizing either LPTA or tradeoff and the quality of the contract 
outcomes. The discovery of relationships between other factors (contract value and 
individual CPARS ratings) was an unexpected benefit from this study. There appears to 
be strong relationships between PALT and contract value for varying degrees across both 
contract methodologies, as previously discussed. Further research is necessary to evaluate 
the influence of these factors by or on the choice of methodology, if any. 
Management in the world of contracting never seems to have enough time to 
perform what needs to be done to maintain fair, ethical and responsible contracting. One 
recommendation from this study is to, where manageable, factor in more time during pre-
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award to allow for more use of tradeoff methods. LPTA is a means of awarding contracts 
faster, with little negotiating on non-cost factors, but without this approach there is no 
telling what innovations are being left on the table. Management can also benefit from 
this study insomuch that there is a necessity to document the pre-award and post-award 
activities related to contract development and performance. In order for academia to 
determine if there is a relationship between actions and outcomes in the world of 
contracting, there must be enough real-world data that can be analyzed. At this time, for 
the variables evaluated in this study, data was not available to confirm without a doubt 
that a pattern exists. Management should examine where gaps in the data exist and try to 
bridge those gaps to ensure benefit from future research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study indicate that the only area where the choice of source 
selection methodology (LPTA or tradeoff) produced significantly different contracting 
outcomes was in the case of the contractor’s CPARS cost rating, where the cost rating 
was worse for tradeoff contracts.  More data and a larger sample is needed to confirm this 
notion.  
There appears to be a strong positive relationship between tradeoff acquisitions 
and PALT and contract value and PALT.  Length of contract preparation is clearly 
impacted to a degree by factors other than just the choice of source selection 
methodology. Contract complexity and dollar value are likely to have an impact on the 
length of time required to put a contract into place. 
There appears to be a strong negative relationship between the CPARS ratings 
and PALT, suggesting that the CPARS ratings decline as the PALT (number of days) 
increases.  This may be the result of an increased chance of contractor negative 
performance the longer it takes for a contract to be put into place, possibly due to a 
breakdown in communication or complexity of the contract. 
There is only a moderately positive linear relationship between PALT and 
CPARS ratings for LPTA acquisitions, indicating that for acquisitions with a longer 
PALT time, the CPARS rating may be better.  This may be the result of better efforts 
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being applied to the contract setup leading to better contractor performance overall.  
There is also a negative linear relationship between the contract value and the CPARS 
ratings for the LPTA acquisitions, suggesting that as the dollar value of the contract 
increases, there is higher risk for more criticism of the deliverables, therefore might be a 
better fit for tradeoff methodology over LPTA. There is a strong positive linear 
relationship between PALT and contract value for LPTA acquisitions, which is possible 
related to the complexity of the contract—the higher the dollar value on the contract, the 
more complex the contract, the longer the PALT.   
For tradeoff acquisition there appears to be a negative relationship between the 
PALT and the CPARS ratings for tradeoff acquisitions, indicating that as the PALT 
increases the CPARS ratings for quality and business relationships are negative. This 
may indicate that even with excessive amounts of time dedicated to contract preparation 
(either due to diligent groundwork or redundant reviews) the CPARS ratings are not 
necessarily better. More time does not guarantee better reviews for the increase in time 
dedicated alone. Further analysis of the CPARS records is necessary, as well as 
management’s oversight to ensure CPARS records are being created in accordance with 
policy.  Finally, further research is needed to determine if the small sample size for this 
experiment is skewing the results and statistical relationships. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION ANSWERS 
In Chapter I of this paper, the following research questions were posited: 
1. Does the utilization of LPTA or tradeoff have an impact on the outcome of 
competitively awarded contracts? 
2. Are acquisition teams making knowledgeable decisions regarding which 
best value methodology is most appropriate for their source selection? 
Question #1 was answered, to limited extent, with the sample size obtained. 
Based on the results of the statistical analysis with this small sample size, there is no firm, 
irrefutable relationship between the methodology choice of LPTA or Tradeoff and the 
contract outcomes. This study should be performed again with a larger sample size to 
study whether a relationship does, in fact, exist. The small sample size may have 
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precluded a MANCOVA and a proper ANCOVA, but the correlation tables (Table 3 in 
Chapter IV) point to relationships that are worth investigating. 
Question #2 cannot be answered, given the lack of a clear relationship between 
the methodology and contract outcomes. There is no conclusive indicator for whether the 
acquisition teams are selecting the appropriate source selection methodology based on 
this limited data. Given that the sample had many more LPTA than tradeoff source 
selections, it seems that PEO EIS is selecting LPTA methods more frequently. Given also 
that the sample was comprised of larger dollar IT acquisitions, one would assume that 
tradeoff might be a better option for achieving best value for the government. This 
assumption also precludes a necessity for innovative solutions; if the requirement is 
relatively standard for this organization there may not be a desire for innovation, nor a 
willingness or necessity to consider non-price factors. LPTA is an appropriate choice for 
COTS purchases, which comprised the majority of the sample, therefore indicating that 
LPTA was appropriately used for this sample of contracts. Further review of pre-award 
decision-making documentation of a larger sample size could shed more light on the 
reasons the acquisition team chose LPTA more frequently than trade off. The sample of 
19 contract actions was comprised of 14 LPTA actions and only five tradeoff actions, 
indicating that LPTA is being utilized more frequently than tradeoff. A larger, more 
diverse sample is necessary to get a better picture for how methodologies are selected for 
a wider range of acquisitions.   
D. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The choice of source selection methodology does appear to have some impact on 
contract outcomes. Managers should stress the importance of this decision with 
acquisition teams entering the source selection phase of the procurement, urging the team 
to consider the choices carefully. The choice of course selection strategy should befit the 
requirement. More data is needed to pinpoint the precise effects of strategy on contract 
outcomes. While some DOD organizations specialize in purchasing bullets, tanks, or 
other tangible goods, all organizations at some point purchase IT, whether in the form of 
simple laptop purchases or more complex services. All organizations therefore should 
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have an interest in learning how to purchase IT in ways that garner the best value for the 
government. This study evaluated a single organization with an IT-purchasing profile 
(numerous COTS purchases), resulting in findings that can be applied to other 
organizations making similar purchases. 
On-the-job training that supports diverse contracting experiences is crucial for 
developing acquisition professionals. LPTA was found to be utilized more often than 
tradeoff in this study as there is further utilization of orders against indefinite delivery 
indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts, General Services Administration (GSA) contract 
vehicles, and Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs), which utilize streamlined 
contracting in the form of orders to award requirements faster. Under IDIQs, GSA 
vehicles and BPA agreements the rates are typically pre-negotiated with the set of 
vendors, leaving little necessity for negotiation and tradeoff tactics. While tradeoff can be 
utilized as a source selection methodology, there could be a tendency to use LPTA 
instead of tradeoff to facilitate an easier evaluation. Increased use of these simplified 
order vehicles may be the result of inexperienced contracting professionals relying on 
pre-established vehicles to streamline acquisitions. There is no problem with utilizing 
established vehicles, other than the hindrance of experiencing successful tradeoff 
acquisitions. Managers should stress the importance of on-the-job training with diverse 
experiences to help personnel gain experience and confidence to explore non-simplified 
acquisitions where tradeoff tactics can be implemented successfully. 
The documentation for simple COTS purchases is often abbreviated, since the 
collective files are likely stored together by the contracting officer, thereby creating a 
larger picture of the entire contract. As contracting officers change, or decentralized 
contracts are utilized by multiple contracting officers and organizations, the 
documentation can become murkier and less clear for someone reviewing the files 
without any context. The future of contract analysis relies on clear documentation and 
accessibility of contract files for review. A great challenge in this study was finding not 
only a sample that could accommodate the statistical equations, but merely finding 
complete contract files and CPARS reports. PEO EIS has experienced multiple 
contracting personnel support changes over time, which results in incomplete contract 
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files and incomplete CPARS reports. Management in other organizations can benefit 
from this study by creating clear regulations and internal guidance for storage of contract 
file documentation, particularly as contract change hands change over time. Proper file 
maintenance may seem an administrative concern, but as systems become more advanced 
and are able to process trends and statistical findings from file data, the potential for 
future findings is limitless. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A constant challenge in this study was finding enough data to run proper 
statistical analyses. The initial goal was to have at least 14 cases of each source selection 
methodology. Only 19 cases were acquired. This was the result of incomplete or 
inaccessible CPARS reports, frequent use of sole source/limited source procurements, or 
inaccessible contract files.  While useful knowledge was obtained from the scaled-down 
statistical analyses, there may be other patterns that would emerge from a larger sample 
size.  
While PEO EIS is a large IT organization with a large mission in the Army, PEO 
EIS is only one organization in the DOD. There are many benefits associated with 
replicating this research in other agencies with similar and with different purchasing 
organizations. The sample for this research contained mostly COTS hardware purchases. 
A sample of service contracts that tend to utilize tradeoff strategies more heavily may 
show very different results. More analysis is necessary to find trends that span the entire 
purchasing profile of the DOD. 
Contract documentation in both pre-award and post-award is an administrative 
function that necessitates detail, objectivity and dedication. The contract manager (either 
contracting officer or COR) is responsible for ensuring that the contract file contains all 
necessary data for review and analysis. The challenge for this research was not only 
gaining access to the contract files and CPARS records (made even more challenging by 
the changing of hands between contracting agencies over the past five years of PEO EIS’ 
contracting history), but ensuring that the pieces of the files necessary for data extraction 
were complete and present. Incomplete CPARS reports, incomplete contract files, and 
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inaccessible contract files and CPARS records were major hurdles experienced during 
data collection.  
This study examined a limited number of contract outcomes and only one 
covariate. There may be other means of measuring contract outcomes, such as earned 
value management (EVM). As stated earlier, this effort can only be fulfilled if the 
contract documentation is detailed enough to support a sample that provides all such data.   
While the goal of this study may not have been entirely achieved, headway was 
made in the field of best value contracting. Acquisition teams need to be prepared to 
handle the unforeseen challenges of the acquisition environment and be prepared with 
skills to procure using not only LPTA but also tradeoff strategies, and be knowledgeable 
of the implications of choosing one method over another. In order to achieve value, the 
playing field must be set up to accommodate that achievement; the DOD needs to be 
training acquisition teams to handle varying degrees of methodologies and exercise 
strong business judgment to gain the benefits of innovation where possible. To harken 
back to Warren Buffett’s words, “Price is what you pay; value is what you get” (Buffett, 
2008, p. 5). In order for the DOD to get the value it is due, acquisition teams need to be 
equipped with the best knowledge regarding implications of their choices. This study has 
begun to explore the impact of methodology on contractual outcomes and has only 
scratched the surface of what the world of best value contracting has to offer.  
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